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Abstract
Modern applications significantly enhance user experience by adapting to each user’s individual
condition and/or preferences. While this adaptation can greatly improve a user’s experience or be
essential for the application to work, the exposure of user data to the application presents a significant
privacy threat to the users—even when the traces are anonymized—since the statistical matching of an
anonymized trace to prior user behavior can identify a user and their habits. Because of the current
and growing algorithmic and computational capabilities of adversaries, provable privacy guarantees as
a function of the degree of anonymization and obfuscation of the traces are necessary. Our previous
work has established the requirements on anonymization and obfuscation in the case that data traces
are independent between users. However, the data traces of different users will be dependent in many
applications, and an adversary can potentially exploit such. In this paper, we consider the impact of
dependency between user traces on their privacy. First, we demonstrate that the adversary can readily
identify the association graph of the obfuscated and anonymized version of the data, revealing which
user data traces are dependent. Next, we demonstrate that the adversary can use this association graph
to break user privacy with significantly shorter traces than in the case of independent users, and that
obfuscating data traces independently across users is often insufficient to remedy such leakage. Finally,
we discuss how users can improve privacy by employing joint obfuscation that removes or reduces the
data dependency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many modern applications provide an enhanced user experience by exploiting users’ character-
istics, including their past choices and present states. In particular, emerging Internet of Things
(IoT) applications include smart homes, healthcare, and connected vehicles that intelligently
tailor their performances to their users. For instance, a typical connected vehicle application
optimizes its route selection based on the current location of the vehicle, traffic conditions, and
the users’ preferences. For such applications to be able to provide their enhanced, user-tailored
performances, they need to request their clients for potentially sensitive user information such
as mobility behaviors and social preferences. Therefore, such applications trade off user privacy
for enhanced utility. Previous work [2] shows that even if users’ data traces are anonymized
before being provided to such applications, standard statistical matching techniques can be used
to leak users’ private information. Thus, privacy and security threats are a major obstacle to the
wide adoption of IoT applications, as demonstrated by prior studies [3]–[18].
The bulk of previous work assumes independence between the traces of different users. [19]–
[25] have mostly considered temporal and spatial dependency within data traces, but not cross-
user dependency. In [19], an obfuscation technique is employed to achieve privacy; however, for
continuous Location-Based Services (LBS) queries, there is often strong temporal dependency
in the locations. Hence, [19] considers how dependency of the users’ obfuscated data can impact
privacy, and then employs an adaptive noise level to achieve more privacy while still maintaining
an acceptable level of utility. Liu et al. [21] show that the spatiotemporal dependency between
neighboring location sets can ruin the privacy achieved using a dummy-based location-privacy
preserving mechanism (LPPM); to solve this problem, they propose a spatiotemporal dependency-
aware privacy protection that perturbs the spatiotemporal dependency between neighboring loca-
tions. Zhang et al. [20] employ Protecting Location Privacy (PLP) against dependency-analysis
attack in crowd sensing: the potential dependency between users’ data is modeled, and the data
is filtered to remove the samples that disclose the user’s private data. In [22], locations of a
single user are temporally dependent, and δ-location set based differential privacy is proposed to
achieve location privacy at every timestamp. Finally, Song et al. [26] provide privacy when there
is dependency within the data of a single user. In summary, previous studies do not consider
3dependency between users, which is the focus of this work. We argue that for many applications,
there is dependency between the traces of different users. For example, friends tend to travel
together or might meet at given places, hence introducing dependency between the traces of their
location information. Several previous works [27]–[33] have considered cross-user dependency;
however, this only has been for protecting queries on aggregated data, which is different than
our application scenario.
We use the notion of “perfect privacy” and “no privacy”, as introduced in our prior work [34],
[35], to evaluate the privacy of user traces. The “perfect privacy” notion provides an information-
theoretic guarantee on privacy in the presence of a strong adversary who has complete knowledge
on users’ prior data traces. On the opposite extreme is the notion of ‘no privacy”. It means
there exists an algorithm for the adversary to estimate the actual data points of users with
diminishing error probability. Through a series of work [34]–[39], we have derived the degree
of user anonymization and data obfuscation required to obtain perfect privacy—assuming that
the data traces of different users are independent across users. Particularly, we evaluated the case
of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from a given user and the case when
there is temporal dependency within the trace of a given user [35], [36] (but independent across
users). In this work, we expand our study to the case where there is dependency between the data
traces of users. That is, we investigate how privacy is affected by the presence of dependency
between the data traces of users when anonymization and obfuscation techniques are used. We
show that dependency significantly reduces the privacy of users. Specifically, we show that the
same anonymization and obfuscation levels that could produce perfect privacy for independent
users result in no privacy for dependent users. Thus, in the presence of inter-user dependency, we
need to employ much stronger anonymization and obfuscation compare to the case data traces
of different users are independent.
We model dependency between user traces with an association graph, where the presence of
an edge between the vertices corresponding to a pair of users indicates a non-zero dependency
between their data traces. We employ standard concentration inequalities to demonstrate that
the adversary can readily determine this association graph. Using this association graph and
statistical data about the users, the adversary can attempt to identify users, and we demonstrate
that this provides the adversary with a significant advantage versus the case when the data
traces of different users are independent of one another. This suggests that, unless additional
countermeasures are employed, the results of [34]–[37] for independent traces are optimistic
4when user traces are dependent. We next consider the effectiveness of countermeasures. First,
we argue that adding independent obfuscation to user data points is often ineffective in improving
the privacy of (dependent) users. Next, we demonstrate that, if users with dependent traces can
jointly design their obfuscation, user privacy can be significantly improved.
A related but parallel approach to our study is graph alignment in which the edge set is sampled
at random. Graph alignment is the problem of finding a matching between the vertices of the
two graphs that matches, or aligns, many edges of the first graph with edges of the second graph.
Shirani et. al. [40], [41] and Cullina et. al. [42] have done significant work on graph alignment.
Although the graph alignment problem looks similar to our problem on the surface, there exist
notable differences between the two. First, in Shirani et. al.’s work [40], [41], [43], graphs are
generated using a model which is sampled at random from a probability distribution, while here
the association graph is deterministic, as it is based on the dependency between data traces of
users. Consequently, Shirani et. al. [40], [41], [43] used a completely different approach and
solution to de-anonymize users. In other words, they have not used the probability distribution
of the data traces of each user to break anonymization, while here the probability distribution
of the data trace of each user is a key characteristic which helps the adversary to break users’
privacy. Finally, Shirani et. al. [40], [41] considered discrete values for the correlation between
users and used them to de-anonymize the graph, while here the correlation between users have
continuous values and the adversary does not have access to the exact value of them.
[42], [44], [45] considered the graph alignment for two correlated graphs, while here we
assume the adversary has the association graph and tries to reconstruct it from the anonymized
and obfuscated data traces. Thus, in our work, the adversary has two identical graphs and their
goal is to identify all of the users based on the observed data and their statistical knowledge
of users. Also, Cullina et. al. [42] considered fractional matching, while here the adversary can
identify not only all of the users but also the data points of each user at all time with small
error probability. [46]–[49] studied matching of non-identical pairs of correlated Erdös-Rényi
graphs.
Also, graph isomorphism studied in [50]–[53] is an instance of the matching problem where
the two graphs are identical copies of one another. [53] studied different algorithms such
as maximum degree algorithms to match two identical graphs for the case where each edge
of the graph has a fixed probability of being present or absent which is in the range of[
ω
(
log n/n 15
)
, 1 − ω
(
log n/n 15
)]
, where n is the number of vertices in the graph. Here, the
5approach of our work is completely different, as the adversary uses probability distributions of
users’ data traces to reconstruct the association graph. After reconstruction of the association
graph, the adversary uses the size of each disjoint group to identify all of the members.
In summary, although matching (alignment) between graphs can be considered as a part of our
analysis, the analysis based on the users’ data traces and the statistical knowledge of the adversary
is a key part of this paper which distinguishes it from previous works on graph alignment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the model and metrics
considered in this work. In Sections III and IV, we show dependency between users’ traces
degrades privacy. In Section V, we discuss how our methodology can be applied to a more
general setting for the association graph. In Section VI, we propose a method to improve privacy
in the case when there exists inter-user dependency. Finally, Section VIII presents the conclusions
and ideas for continuing work.
A. Summary of the Results
Consider a setting with n total users. As in our previous work [35], privacy depends on two
parameters: (1) m = m(n), the number of data points after which the pseudonyms of users are
changed in the anonymization technique, i.e., smaller m implies higher levels of anonymization;
and (2) an, which indicates the amplitude of the obfuscation noise, i.e., larger an implies higher
levels of obfuscation.
When there are a large number of users in the setting (n → ∞) and each user’s dataset is
governed by an i.i.d. process with r possible values for each data point (e.g., r possible locations),
we obtain a no-privacy region in the m(n) − an plane. Figure 1a shows the no-privacy region
for the case when there exists inter-user dependency, and Figure 1b shows the no-privacy region
when the users’ traces are independent across users. There exists a larger no-privacy region in the
presence of inter-user dependency; therefore, we find that dependency between users weakens
their privacy.
In addition, for the case where users’ datasets are governed by an irreducible and aperiodic
Markov chains with r states and |E | edges, we obtain similar results, again showing that inter-user
dependency degrades user privacy.
Note that for only anonymization case, an initial extension in Gaussian case with known
covariance matrix is also presented in [54].
6(a) The dependent case. (b) The independent case.
Fig. 1: Representations of the no-privacy region in the case of dependent and independent users.
Note that m(n) is the number of the adversary’s observations per user (degree of anonymization),
and an is the amount of noise level (degree of obfuscation). Here, the size of the group of users
whose data traces are dependent is equal to s.
II. FRAMEWORK
Here, we employ a similar framework to [34], [35]. The system has n users, and Xu(k) is the
data point of user u at time k. Our main goal is protecting Xu(k) from a strong adversary who
has full knowledge of the (unique) marginal probability distribution function of the data points
of each user based on previous observations or other sources. In order to achieve data privacy
for users, both anonymization and obfuscation techniques can be used as shown in Figure 2. In
Figure 2, Zu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user u at time k after applying obfuscation,
and Yu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user u at time k after applying anonymization to
Zu(k). Let m = m(n) be the number of data points after which the pseudonyms of users are
changed using anonymization. To break obfuscation and anonymization, the adversary tries to
estimate Xu(k), k = 1, 2, · · · ,m, from m observations per user by matching the sequence of
observations to the known statistical characteristics of the users. Let Xu be the m × 1 vector
Fig. 2: Applying obfuscation and anonymization techniques to the users’ data points.
7containing the data points of user u, and X be the m × n matrix with the uth column equal to
Xu:
Xu =

Xu(1)
Xu(2)
...
Xu(m)

, X = [X1 X2 · · · Xn] .
Data Points Model: Here, we assume two different models for users’ data points: in the first
case, we assume the sequence of data for any individual user is modeled by i.i.d. which could
apply directly to data that is sampled at a low rate. In addition, understanding the i.i.d. case can
also be considered the first step toward understanding the more complicated case where there is
temporal dependency. In the second case, we assume the data trace of any individual users is
governed by Markov chain in which each sample of users’ data is dependent over time.
We also assume users’ data points can have one of r possible values (0, 1, · · · , r−1). Thus, ac-
cording to a user-specific probability distribution (pu), Xu(k) is equal to a value in {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}
at any time. Note pu(i) is the probability of user u having the data value i, so
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, for each u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
We also assume pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function, fP(pu),
which has support on a subset of the (0, 1)r−1 hypercube. Note these user-specific probability
distributions, i.e., pu’s, are known to the adversary and form the basis upon which they perform
(statistical) matching.
Association Graph: An association graph or dependency graph is an undirected graph repre-
senting dependency of the data of users with each other. Let G(V, F) denote the association
8graph with set of nodes V, (|V| = n), and set of edges F. Two vertices (users) are connected
if their data sets are dependent. More specifically,
• (u, u′) < F iff I(Xu(k); Xu′(k)) = 0,
• (u, u′) ∈ F iff I(Xu(k); Xu′(k)) > 0,
where I (Xu(k); Xu′(k)) is the mutual information between the k th data point of user u and user
u′1.
Obfuscation Model: Obfuscation perturbs the users’ data points [55]–[57]; in other words, the
obfuscation can be viewed as passing data through a noisy channel. Normally, in such settings,
each user has only limited knowledge of the characteristics of the overall population. Thus,
usually, a simple distributed method in which the data points of each user are reported with
error with a certain probability is employed [58]. Note that this probability itself is generated
randomly for each user. Let Zu be the vector that contains the obfuscated version of user u’s
data points, and Z be the collection of Zu for all users,
Zu =

Zu(1)
Zu(2)
...
Zu(m)

, Z = [Z1 Z2 · · · Zn] .
Here, we define the asymptotic noise level for an obfuscation technique. Loosely speaking,
the asymptotic noise level of obfuscation is the highest probable percentage of data points that
are corrupted. More precisely, for a subset of users U, let Xu(k) be the actual data point of user
u at time k, u ∈ U, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, and let Zu(k) be the obfuscated (noisy) version of Xu(k).
Define
Am(u) = |{k : Zu(k) , Xu(k)}|m .
Then, the asymptotic noise level for user u is defined as follows:
a(u) = inf
{
τ ≥ 0 : P (Am(u) > τ) → 0 as m→∞
}
.
1It is worth noting that the mechanism that determines the joint distribution of Xu(k) and Xu′(k) does not affect the results
of this paper as long as the marginal densities of Xu(k)’s (i.e., pu’s) are drawn independently from fP(pu).
9Also, define
Am =
∑
u∈U
|{k : Zu(k) , Xu(k)}|
m|U | ,
then, the asymptotic noise level for the entire dataset is
a = inf
{
τ ≥ 0 : P (Am > τ) → 0 as m→∞
}
.
Note that while the above definition is given for a general case required in Section VI, in
practice we often use simple obfuscation techniques that employ i.i.d. noise sequences. Then,
by the Strong Law of Large Number (SLLN),
|{k : Zu(k) , Xu(k)}|
m
a.s.−−→ P (Zu(k) , Xu(k)) ,
and for any k,
a(u) = P (Zu(k) , Xu(k)) .
Anonymization Model: In the anonymization technique, the identity of the users is perturbed [2],
[59]–[64]. Anonymization is modeled by a random permutation Π on the set of n users. Let Yu
be the vector which contains the anonymized version of Zu, and Y is the collection of Yu for
all users, thus
Y = Perm (Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn;Π)
=
[
ZΠ−1(1) ZΠ−1(2) · · · ZΠ−1(n)
]
= [Y1 Y2 · · · Yn] ,
where Perm( . ,Π) is the permutation operation with permutation function Π. As a result, Yu =
ZΠ−1(u) and YΠ(u) = Zu.
Adversary Model: We assume the adversary has full knowledge of the marginal probability
distribution function of each of the users on {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}. As discussed in the data points
models in succeeding sections, the parameters pu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n are drawn independently from
a continuous density function, fP(pu), which has support on a subset of a given hypercube. The
density fP(pu) might be unknown to the adversary, so all that is assumed here is that such a
density exists. From the results of the paper, it will be evident that knowing or not knowing
fP(pu) does not change the results asymptotically.
The adversary knows the anonymization mechanism but does not know the realization of the
random permutation. The adversary also knows the obfuscation mechanism but does not know
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the realization of the noise parameters. And finally, the adversary knows the association graph
G(V, F), but does not necessarily know the exact nature of the dependency. That is, while the
adversary knows the marginal distributions Xu(k) as well as which pairs of users have strictly
positive mutual information, they might not know the joint distributions or even the values of
the mutual information I(Xu(k); Xu′(k)).
It is critical to note that the adversary does not have any other auxiliary information or side
information about users’ data.
We adopt the definitions of perfect privacy and no privacy from [34], [35]:
Definition 1. For an algorithm for the adversary that tries to estimate the actual data point of
user u at time k, define the error probability as
Pe(u, k) = P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) ,
where Xu(k) is the actual data point of user u at time k, Xu(k) is the adversary’s estimated data
point of user u at time k. Now, define E as the set of all possible adversary’s estimators. Then,
user u has no privacy at time k, if and only if for large enough n,
P∗e(u, k) = infE P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) → 0.
Hence, a user has no privacy if there exists an algorithm for the adversary to estimate Xu(k)
with diminishing error probability as n goes to infinity.
Definition 2. User u has perfect privacy at time k if and only if
lim
n→∞ I (Xu(k); Y) = 0,
where I (Xu(k); Y) denotes the mutual information between the data point of user u at time k
and the collection of the adversary’s observations for all the users.
Discussion 1: The studied anonymization and obfuscation mechanisms improve user privacy
at the cost of user utility. An anonymization mechanism works by frequently changing the
pseudonym mappings of users to reduce the length of time series that can be exploited by statis-
tical analysis. However, such frequent changes may also degrade the usability of the underlying
application by concealing the temporal relation between a user’s data points, e.g., for a dining
recommendation system that makes suggestions based on the dining history of its users. On the
other hand, obfuscation mechanisms work by adding noise to users’ collected data, e.g., location
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information. The added noise may also degrade the utility of the system. In this work, our goal
is studying the level of anonymization and obfuscation one should employ to ensure privacy
with the minimum loss in utility. In other words, we derive the optimal frequency of changing
user pseudonyms during anonymization, and the optimal extent of noise added by an obfuscation
mechanism while guaranteeing privacy.
However, like similar works in privacy [2], [18], [59]–[62], we consider the quantification of
utility orthogonal to our privacy evaluations for two reasons: (1) the implications of our PPMs
on utility do not impact our privacy analysis, and (2) unlike privacy, the desired level of utility
is application specific.
Discussion 2: Note that there are two kinds of dependency:
• Intra-user dependency: In this case, there is temporal and spatial dependency within data
traces of one user. For example, when the data trace of a user is governed by a Markov
chain model, the Markov chain characterizes temporal intra-user dependency. Thus, the
adversary can benefit from this dependency and break the users’ privacy. According to
the results obtained in [35], if data traces of the users are governed by i.i.d. statistics, we
can show users have no privacy iff m = Ω(n 2r−1+α) and an = O(n− 1r−1−β); however, if the
data trace of users is governed by a Markov chain, we can show users have no privacy iff
m = Ω(n 2|E |−r +α) and an = O(n−
1
|E |−r −β). Most of the previous work [19]–[25] that considers
intra-user dependency assumes independence between the traces of different users, which
is different from our work as described below.
• Inter-user dependency: Here, there exists dependency between the traces of different users.
This is the main focus of our work. First, we demonstrate that the adversary can readily
identify the association graph of the obfuscated and anonymized version of the data, reveal-
ing which user data traces are dependent. Next, we demonstrate that the adversary can use
this association graph along with their statistical knowledge and the observed obfuscated
and anonymized sequences to break user privacy with significantly shorter traces than in
the case of independent users, and that obfuscating data traces independently across users
is often insufficient to remedy such leakage.
Discussion 3: The general models of multi-user in classical information theory assume a fixed
number of users and the fundamental limits of communication systems are characterized by
studying the asymptotic limits of infinite coding blocklength [65]–[68]. However, the emerging
Internet of Things enables an ever-increasing number of users to share and access information on
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a large scale, i.e., applications, such as ride sharing and dining recommendation applications, the
number of users is large. Thus, the number of users is allowed to grow with the blocklength [69]–
[71], and our goal is for the asymptotic results to provide a good insight to the performance of the
privacy-preserving mechanisms for these applications. Moreover, both of the privacy definitions
given above (perfect privacy and no privacy) are asymptotic in the number of users (n → ∞),
which allows us to find clean analytical results for the fundamental limits.
III. IMPACT OF DEPENDENCY ON PRIVACY USING ANONYMIZATION
In this section, we consider only anonymization and thus the obfuscation block in Figure 2
is not present. In this case, the adversary’s observation Y is the anonymized version of X; thus
Y = Perm (X1,X2, · · · ,Xn;Π)
=
[
XΠ−1(1) XΠ−1(2) · · · XΠ−1(n)
]
= [Y1 Y2 · · · Yn] .
A. r-State i.i.d. Model
There is potentially dependency between the data of different users, but we assume here that
the sequence of data for any individual user is i.i.d.. We also assume users’ data points can have
r possibilities (0, 1, · · · , r − 1), and pu(i) is the probability of user u having the data value i, i.e.,
pu(i) = P (Xu(k) = i), for k = 1, 2, · · · ,m. We define the vectors pu and p as
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, p = [p1 p2 · · · pn] .
We also assume pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function, fP(pu),
which has support on a subset of the (0, 1)r−1 hypercube. In particular, define the range of the
distribution as
RP =
{(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ (0, 1)r−1 : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xr−1 < 1} ,
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then, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:
δ1 ≤ fP(pu) ≤ δ2, pu ∈ RP.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < RP.
The adversary knows the values of pu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n, and uses this knowledge to match the
observed traces to the users. We will use capital letters (i.e., Pu) when we are referring to the
random variable, and use lower case (i.e., pu) to refer to the realization of Pu.
A vector containing the permutation of those probabilities after anonymization is
W = Perm (P1,P2, · · · ,Pn;Π)
=
[
PΠ−1(1) PΠ−1(2) · · · PΠ−1(n)
]
= [W1 W2 · · · Wn] ,
where Wu = PΠ−1(u) and WΠ(u) = Pu.
In this case, we can say:
• (u, u′) < F iff for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, puu′(i, j) = pu(i)pu′( j),
• (u, u′) ∈ F iff for at least one pair of i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, puu′(i, j) , pu(i)pu′( j),
where puu′(i, j) = P (Xu(k) = i, Xu′(k) = j), pu(i) = P (Xu(k) = i), and pu′( j) = P (Xu′(k) = j).
Note that the adversary knows the association graph G(V, F), but does not necessarily know the
joint probability distribution for each specific (u, u′) ∈ F. The adversary observes the anonymized
version of users’ data traces and combines them with their full knowledge of the marginal
probability distribution of each of the users and the structure of the whole association graph to
break users’ privacy with arbitrarily small error probability.
In the first step, we show that the adversary can reliably reconstruct the entire association
graph for the anonymized version of the data (i.e., the observed data traces) with relatively few
observations.
Lemma 1. Consider a general association graph G(V, F). If the adversary obtains m = (log n)3
anonymized observations per user, they can construct G˜ = G˜(V˜, F˜), where V˜ = {Π(u) : u ∈
V} = V, such that with high probability, for all u, u′ ∈ V; (u, u′) ∈ F iff (Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ F˜. We
write this statement as P(G˜ ' G) → 1, i.e., Graph G and Graph G˜ are isomorphic with high
probability.
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Proof. For u, u′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, we normally write v = Π(u) and v′ = Π(u′). We provide an
algorithm for the adversary that with high probability obtains all edges of F correctly. First, for
all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, and all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1} the adversary computes pvv′(i, j), pv(i),
and pv′( j) as follow: pvv′(i, j) = |{k : Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j}|m = M̂vv′(i, j)m , (1)
pv(i) = |{k : Yv(k) = i}|m = M̂v(i)m , (2)
pv′( j) = |{k : Yv′(k) = j}|m = M̂v′( j)m , (3)
where
M̂vv′(i, j) = |{k : Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j}|.
M̂v(i) = |{k : Yv(k) = i}|.
M̂v′( j) = |{k : Yv′(k) = j}|.
After observing m = (log n)3 data points per user and computing the above expressions, the
adversary constructs G˜ in the following way:
• If
 M̂vv′(i, j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m  ≤ m− 15 for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, then (v, v′) < F˜ .
• If
 M̂vv′(i, j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m  ≥ m− 15 for at least one pair of i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r−1}, then (v, v′) ∈ F˜ .
We show the above method yields P(G˜ ' G) → 1 as n→∞, as follows. Note
M̂vv′(i, j) ∼ Binomial(m,wvv′(i, j)),
M̂v(i) ∼ Binomial(m,wv(i)),
M̂v′( j) ∼ Binomial(m,wv′( j)),
where wvv′(i, j) = P (Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j) = pΠ−1(v)Π−1(v′)(i, j), wv(i) = P (Yv(k) = i) = pΠ−1(v)(i),
and wv′( j) = P (Yv′(k) = j) = pΠ−1(v′)( j). Now, for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r−
1}, define
Jvv′(i, j) =
{Mvv′(i, j)m − wvv′(i, j) ≥ m− 14 } ,
then, for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, the Chernoff bound yields
P (Jvv′(i, j)) ≤ 2e−
√
m
3wvv′ (i, j) ≤ 2e−
√
m
3 .
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Similarly, for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, define
Jv(i) =
{Mv(i)m − wv(i) ≥ m− 14 } ,
Jv′( j) =
{Mv′( j)m − wv′( j) ≥ m− 14 } ,
then, the Chernoff bound yields,
P (Jv(i)) ≤ 2e−
√
m
3 ,
P (Jv′( j)) ≤ 2e−
√
m
3 ,
Now, by employing a union bound, for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, we
have
P (Jvv′(i, j) ∪ Jv(i) ∪ Jv′( j)) ≤ 2
(
e−
√
m
3 + e−
√
m
3 + e−
√
m
3
)
= 6e−
√
m
3 .
Then, by employing a union bound again,
P
©­«
n⋃
v=1
n⋃
v′=1
r−1⋃
i=0
r−1⋃
j=0
{Jvv′(i, j) ∪ Jv(i) ∪ Jv′( j)}ª®¬ ≤
n∑
v=1
n∑
v′=1
r−1∑
i=0
r−1∑
j=0
6e−
√
m
3
= 6n2r2e−
√
m
3
= 6r2 exp
{
2 log n − (log n)
3
2
3
}
→ 0, (4)
as n → ∞. Thus, (4) yields that with high probability, for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all
i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, we have
0 ≤ mwvv′(i, j) − m 34 ≤ M̂vv′(i, j) ≤ mwvv′(i, j) + m 34 . (5)
0 ≤ mwv(i) − m 34 ≤ M̂v(i) ≤ mwv(i) + m 34 . (6)
0 ≤ mwv′( j) − m 34 ≤ M̂v′( j) ≤ mwv( j) + m 34 . (7)
Let us define event Avv′(i, j) as the event that (5), (6), and (7) are all valid, thus, as shown in
(4), we have
P
©­«
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Avv′(i, j)}ª®¬→ 1, (8)
16
as n→∞. Now, if Avv′(i, j) is true for some v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and some i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r−1},
we have
M̂vv′(i, j)
m
− M̂v(i)
m
M̂v′( j)
m
≤ mwvv′(i, j) + m
3
4
m
− mwv(i) − m
3
4
m
mwv′(i) − m 34
m
= wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) + m− 14 + (wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 − m− 12
≤ wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) + m− 14 + (wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 + m− 12 . (9)
Similarly,
M̂vv′(i, j)
m
− M̂v(i)
m
M̂v′( j)
m
≥ mwvv′(i, j) − m
3
4
m
− mwv(i) + m
3
4
m
mwv′(i) + m 34
m
= wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) − m− 14 − (wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 − m− 12 . (10)
Thus, by using (9) and (10), we have
(
M̂vv′(i, j)
m
− M̂v(i)
m
M̂v′( j)
m
)
− (wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j))
 ≤ (1 + wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 + m− 12 .
(11)
Let us define event Bvv′(i, j) as the event that (11) is valid for v, v′, i, and j. We have shown,
for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, Avv′(i, j) ⊆ Bvv′(i, j), thus
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Avv′(i, j)}
 ⊆

n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Bvv′(i, j)}
 ,
and as a result,
P
©­«
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Bvv′(i, j)}ª®¬ ≥ P ©­«
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Avv′(i, j)}ª®¬ .
Thus, by using (8), we have
P
©­«
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Bvv′(i, j)}ª®¬→ 1,
as n→∞. Hence, with high probability, for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r−1},
we have
(
M̂vv′(i, j)
m
− M̂v(i)
m
M̂v′( j)
m
)
− (wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j))
 ≤ (1 + wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 + m− 12 .
(12)
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Now, if (u, u′) < F, then for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, we have puu′(i, j) − pu(i)pu′( j) = 0, and
as a result, wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) = 0. Thus, by using (12), we have M̂vv′(i, j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m
 ≤ (1 + wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 + m− 12 ,
and as a result, for large enough m, M̂vv′(i, j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m
 ≤ m− 15 .
Thus, we can conclude, (v, v′) < F˜, and in other words, (Π(u),Π(u′)) < F˜. This is true with high
probability, for all u, u′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} where (u, u′) < F .
Similarly, if (u, u′) ∈ F, there exists at least one pair of i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1} with puu′(i, j) −
pu(i)pu′( j) ≥  − m− 14 for a fixed value of  . Thus, there exists at least one pair of i, j ∈
{0, 1, · · · , r − 1} with wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) ≥  − m− 14 . As a result, by using (12), for large
enough m, we have  M̂vv′(i, j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m
 ≥ m− 15 .
Thus, we can conclude, (v, v′) ∈ F˜, and in other words, (Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ F˜. Again, this is true
with high probability, for all u, u′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} where (u, u′) ∈ F .
Now, we can conclude, for large enough n, we have P
(
G˜ ' G
)
→ 1, so the adversary can
reconstruct the association graph of the anonymized version of the data with an arbitrarily
small error probability. Note that reconstruction of the association graph does not require the
adversary’s knowledge about user statistics (i.e., the values of pu’s). 
The structure of the association graph (G) can leak a lot of information. For the rest of this
section, we consider a graph structure shown in Figure 3. In this structure, Gl , the subgraph
consisting of the users the adversary wants to de-anonymize, has sl vertices and is disjoint
from the reminder of the association graph. So, we can write Gl(Vl, Fl), where |Vl | = sl . Note
that we assume sl is finite. In particular, the subgraph Gl can be thought of as a group of
“friends” or “associates” such that their data sets are dependent. In Section V, we discuss how
our methodology can be applied to the settings where the subgraph Gl is not disjoint from the
reminder of the graph (G′) [72]–[81].
The following theorem states that if the number of observations per user (m) is significantly
larger than n
2
s(r−1)+α in the r-state model, where s is the size of a group, then the adversary can
successfully de-anonymize the users in that group.
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Fig. 3: The structure of the association graph (G): Group l with sl vertices is disjoint from the
reminder of the association graph (G′).
Theorem 1. For the above r-state model, if Y is the anonymized version of X as defined above,
the size of the group including user 1 is s, and
• m = Ω
(
n
2
s(r−1)+α
)
, for any α > 0;
then, user 1 has no privacy at time k.
Discussion 4: It is insightful to compare this result to [34, Theorem 2], where it is stated
that if the users are not dependent, then all users have perfect privacy as long as the number of
adversary’s observations per user (m) is smaller than O(n 2r−1−α). Here, Theorem 1 states that with
much smaller m, the adversary can de-anonymize the users. Therefore, we see that dependency
can significantly reduce the privacy of users.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. As shown in Figure 4, the proof of Theorem 1 consists of three parts:
• First Step: Showing the adversary can reconstruct the association graph of the anonymized
version of the data with an arbitrarily small error probability (as shown in Figure 4a).
• Second Step: Showing the adversary can uniquely identify Group 1 with an arbitrarily
small error probability (as shown in Figure 4b).
• Third Step: Showing the adversary can individually identify all the members within Group
1 with an arbitrarily small error probability (as shown in Figure 4c).
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(a) First step: Reconstruction of the association graph from the observed data.
(b) Second step: Identifying Group 1 among all of the groups after association graph is reconstructed.
(c) Third step: Identifying user 1 among all of the members of Group 1 after Group 1 is uniquely
identified.
Fig. 4: The algorithm of the adversary to estimate data points of user 1 with vanishing error
probability.
20
The first part of the proof exploits the fact that the adversary can readily reconstruct the
association graph of the anonymized data in m = (log n)3. It is the second and third parts that
give rise to the condition m = Ω
(
n
2
s(r−1)+α
)
, and it is in the second part where we see the
mechanism for the speed-up of the adversary’s algorithm relative to the case where user traces
are independent. In particular, due to the dependence between users breaking them into groups,
the key search for the adversary now involves finding a set of users corresponding to a length-s
vector of probabilities rather than searching for a single user associated with a given probability.
First step: Reconstruction of the association graph: In this step, we use Lemma 1. More
specifically, since n
2
s(r−1) > (log n)3 for large enough n, we can use Lemma 1 to conclude that
the adversary can reconstruct the association graph with arbitrarily small error probability.
Second step: Identifying Group 1 among all of the groups: Now, assume the size of Group
1 is s. Without loss of generality, suppose the members of Group 1 are users {1, 2, · · · , s}. Note
that there are at most ns isolated groups of size s in the association graph. We call these Groups
1, 2, · · · , ns . The adversary needs to first identify Group 1 among all of these groups.
First, for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, the adversary computes pu(i) as:pu(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}|m = M̂u(i)m , (13)
and as a result, pΠ(u)(i) = |{k : Xu(k) = i}|m = Mu(i)m , (14)
where M̂u(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}| and Mu(i) = |{k : Xu(k) = i}|. Let pu be the collection of pu(i)
and pΠ(u) be the collection of pΠ(u)(i) for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}:
p˜u =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, pΠ(u) =

pΠ(u)(1)
pΠ(u)(2)
...
pΠ(u)(r − 1)

.
Now, define Σs as the set of all permutations on s elements; for σ ∈ Σs, σ : {1, 2, · · · , s} →
{1, 2, · · · , s} is a one-to-one mapping.
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First, we provide the definition of a distance measure D (Φ,Ψ) for vectors
Φ = [Φ1 Φ2 · · · Φs] ,
Ψ = [Ψ1 Ψ2 · · · Ψs] ,
where Φu ∈ Rr−1 and Ψu ∈ Rr−1. Define
D (Φ,Ψ) = min
σ∈Σs
{
max
{ | |Φ1 −Ψσ(1) | |∞, | |Φ2 −Ψσ(2) | |∞, · · · , | |Φs −Ψσ(s) | |∞}} ,
where for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s},
| |Φu −Ψσ(u) | |∞ = max
{ |Φu(i) − Ψσ(u)(i)| : i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1} .
Here, let P(l) be a vector which contains probability distributions of users belonging to Group l,
and P˜(l)
Π
be a vector which contains the estimate of the adversary about the probability distribution
of users belong to Group l. For example, for Group 1, we have
P(1) = [p1 p2 · · · ps] ,
and
P˜(1)
Π
=
[pΠ(1) pΠ(2) · · · pΠ(s)] .
Now, we claim for m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α and large enough n,
• P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1,
• P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→ 0 ,
where ∆n = n
− 1
s(r−1)−α4 .
Define the hypercubes of F (n) and H (n) as
F (n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xs) ∈
(
R(r−1)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ ∆n, u = 1, 2, · · · , s
}
,
H (n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xs) ∈
(
R(r−1)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ 2∆n, u = 1, 2, · · · , s
}
,
Figure 5 shows sets F (n) and H (n) in the case r = s = 2.
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Fig. 5: P(1), sets F (n) and H (n) for the case r = s = 2.
First, we prove P˜(1)
Π
is in set F (n), thus, D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n. Note that for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}
and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, a Chernoff bound yields
P
(Mu(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n) ≤ 2e−m∆2n3pu
= 2e
−
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
)2 (
1
3pu
)
≤ 2e− c3 n
α
2
. (15)
Thus, for all u ∈ Group 1 and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, (15) and the union bound yield
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
r−1∑
i=1
P
(Mu(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2s(r − 1)e− c3 n
α
2 → 0,
as n→∞. As a result, D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n with high probability.
In the next step, we prove P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→ 0. Note that for all groups other
than Group 1, we have
(4∆n)s(r−1)δ1 ≤ P
(
P(l) ∈ H (n)
)
≤ (4∆n)s(r−1)δ2,
and as a result,
P
(
P(l) ∈ H (n)
)
≤ δ2(4∆n)s(r−1)
= δ24s(r−1)
1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
.
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Similarly, for any σ ∈ Σs,
P
(
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
)
≤ δ2(4∆n)s(r−1)
= δ24s(r−1)
1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
,
and since |Σs | = s!, by a union bound,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{ ⋃
σ∈Σs
{
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
}}ª®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
∑
σ∈Σs
P
(
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
)
≤ n
s
s!δ24s(r−1)
1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
= (s − 1)!4s(r−1)δ2n−α4 s(r−1) → 0,
as n→∞. Thus, all P(l)’s are outside of H (n) with high probability.
Now, given the fact that all P(l)’s are outside ofH (n), we prove P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→
0. We show that P˜(l)
Π
’s are close to P(l)’s, and as a result, they will be outside of F (n). For all
u ∈ Group l and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, (15) and the union bound yield,
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
= P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
r−1∑
i=1
P
(Mu(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2s(r − 1)e− c3 n
α
2
.
Now by using a union bound, again, we have
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
}ª®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤ n
s
2s(r − 1)e− c3 n
α
2
= 2n(r − 1)e− c3 n
α
2 → 0,
as n→∞. Thus, for all l ∈ {2, 3, · · · , ns }, P˜(l)Π ’s are close to P(l)’s, thus, they will be outside of
F (n) with high probability. Now, we can conclude as n→∞,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®¬→ 0.
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This means that with high probability all P˜(l)
Π
’s are outside of F (n), so the adversary can
successfully identify Group 1.
Third step: Identifying user 1 among all of the members of Group 1: In this step, we
prove that, after identifying Group 1, the adversary can correctly identify each member. This
step can be done using a similar approach to the one above. We define two sets B(n) and C(n)
around p1. We will show that with high probability, the true estimated value of p1 (shown as
p˜1) is inside of B(n). Also, all pu’s of other members of Group 1 are outside of C(n), and since
their estimated values are close to pu’s, the estimated values will be outside of B(n). Therefore,
the adversary can successfully invert the permutation Π within Group 1 and identify all of the
members. Below are the details.
From (13) and (14), for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s} and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, we havepu(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}|m ,
and as a result, pΠ(u)(i) = |{k : Xu(k) = i}|m = Mu(i)m ,
where Mu(i) = |{k : Xu(k) = i}|. Let’s define sets B(n) and C(n) as
B(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ ∆n, i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1
}
,
C(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ 2∆n, i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1
}
,
where ∆n = n
− 1
s(r−1)−α4 . Figure 6 shows p1, sets B(n) and C(n) in range of RP for case r = 3.
Now, we claim for m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α,
1) P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1,
2) P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0,
as n→∞. Thus, the adversary can identify Π(1) by examining p˜u’s and choosing the only one
that belongs to B(n).
First, we want to show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1.
25
Fig. 6: p1, sets B(n) and C(n) in RP for case r = 3.
For all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, By using (15) and the union bound, we have
P
(pΠ(1) < B(n)) ≤ r−1∑
i=1
P
(M1(i)m − p1(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ (r − 1)
(
2e−
c
3 n
α
2
)
,
thus,
P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) ≥ 1 − 2(r − 1)e− c3 nα2 → 1,
as n→∞.
Now, we need to show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0.
First, we show as n goes to infinity,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{
pu ∈ C(n)
})
→ 0.
Note
4 (∆n)r−1 δ1 < P
(
pu ∈ C(n)
)
< 4 (∆n)r−1 δ2,
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and according to the union bound, for large enough n, we have
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{
pu ∈ C(n)
})
≤
s∑
u=2
P
(
pu ∈ C(n)
)
≤ 4s (∆n)r−1 δ2
≤ 4s 1
n
1
s+
α(r−1)
4
δ2 → 0;
thus, all pu’s are outside of C(n) with high probability.
Now, we claim that given all pu’s are outside of C(n), P
(pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) is small. Note, for all
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, by using (15) and the union bounds, we have
P
(pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) ≤ P (pΠ(u) − pu ≥ ∆n)
≤
r−1∑
i=1
P
(Mu(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2(r − 1)e− c3 n
α
2
.
As a result, by using another union bound, as n becomes large,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) − pu ≥ ∆n}) ≤ s (2(r − 1)e− c3 nα2 ) → 0.
Thus, for all u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , s}, pΠ(u)’s are close to pu’s, thus they will be outside of B(n). Now,
we can conclude as n→∞ that:
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0.
Thus, we have proved that if m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α, there exists an algorithm for the adversary
to successfully recover user 1. Remember, the adversary identifies the members of Group 1
independent of the structure of the subgraph. 
B. r-State Markov Chain Model
In Sections III-A, we assumed each user’s data patterns was i.i.d.; however, in this section,
users’ data patterns are modeled using Markov chains in which each user’s data points are
dependent over time. In this model, we again assume there are r possibilities for each users’
data point, i.e., Xu(k) ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}. More specifically, each user’s data set is modeled by
a Markov chain with r states. It is assumed that the Markov chains of all users have the same
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structure but have different transition probabilities. Let E be the set of edges in the assumed
transition graph, so, (i, j) ∈ E if there exists an edge from state i to state j, meaning that
pu(i, j) = P (Xu(k + 1) = j |Xu(k) = i) > 0. The transition matrix is a square matrix used to
describe the transitions of a Markov chain; thus, different users can have different transition
probability matrices. Note for each state i, we have
r−1∑
j=1
pu(i, j) = 1, so, the adversary can focus
on a subset of size d = |E | − r of the transition probabilities for recovering the entire transition
matrix. Let pu be the vector that contains these transition probabilities for user u. We write
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(|E | − r)

, p = [p1 p2 · · · pn] .
We also consider all pu(i)’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function,
fP(pu), on the (0, 1)|E |−r hypercube. Define the range of distribution as
RP =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , x|E |−r) ∈ (0, 1)|E |−r : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + x|E |−r < 1
}
,
and as before, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0, such that
δ1 ≤ fP(pu) ≤ δ2, pu ∈ Rp.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < Rp.
Now, we can repeat the similar steps as the previous sections to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain model, if Y is the anonymized version
of X as defined above, the size of the group including user 1 is s, and
• m = Ω
(
n
2
s( |E |−r)+α
)
, for any α > 0;
then, user 1 has no privacy at time k.
Proof. The basic ideas behind the proof of Theorem 2 are similar to the ones for Theorems 1;
thus, in this part we just focus on the differences and key ideas.
Define the random variable Mu(i) as the total number of visits by user u to state i, for all
u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}. Since the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic,
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and m→∞, all Mi(u)m converge to their stationary values [82]. Given Mu(i) = mu(i), the transitions
from state i to state j for user u has a multinomial distribution with probabilities pu(i, j). Now,
considering the fact that the vector pu uniquely determines the user u, the adversary can invert
the anonymization permutation function in a similar way to the i.i.d. case by focusing on pu’s.
Let
Φ = [Φ1 Φ2 · · · Φs] ,
Ψ = [Ψ1 Ψ2 · · · Ψs] ,
where Φu ∈ R|E |−r and Ψu ∈ R|E |−r . Define
D (Φ,Ψ) = min
σ∈Σs
{
max
{ | |Φ1 −Ψσ(1) | |∞, | |Φ2 −Ψσ(2) | |∞, · · · , | |Φs −Ψσ(s) | |∞}} ,
where for u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s},
| |Φu −Ψσ(u) | |∞ = max
{ |Φu(i) − Ψσ(u)(i)| : i = 1, 2, · · · , |E | − r} .
and we claim for m = cn
2
s( |E |−r)+α and large enough n,
• P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆′n
)
→ 1,
• P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆′n
})
→ 0 ,
where ∆′n = n
− 1
s( |E |−r)−α4 . This can be shown similar to the proof of Theorem 1. First, define F ′(n)
and H ′(n) as
F ′(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xs) ∈
(
R(|E |−r)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ ∆′n, u = 1, 2, · · · , s
}
;
H ′(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xs) ∈
(
R(|E |−r)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ 2∆′n, u = 1, 2, · · · , s
}
;
then, prove that the adversary can identify Group 1 successfully.
In the next step, the adversary has to identify each member of Group 1 correctly. Define sets
B′(n) and C′(n) as
B′(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xd) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ ∆′n, i = 1, 2, · · · , d
}
,
C′(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xd) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ 2∆′n, i = 1, 2, · · · , d
}
,
where ∆′n = n
− 1
s( |E |−r)−α4 . Now, we claim for m = cn
2
s( |E |−r)+α,
1) P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B′(n)) → 1,
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2) P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B′(n)}) → 0,
as n→∞. This can be shown similar to the proof of Theorem 1, so the adversary can successfully
recover data traces of user 1. 
Discussion 5: Note that the i.i.d. case can also be written as a Markov chain with a transition
matrix with identical rows; then, |E | = r2. However, for the i.i.d. case, if the adversary knows
r−1 elements of a row, they know that row and all of the others. In other words, if we restrict the
users’ data models to i.i.d., then we are using a different model where pu(i)’s are restricted in a
way to create an i.i.d. sequence. This is a different model and is not compatible to our model for
the Markov chain where pu(i)’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function,
fP(pu), on the (0, 1)|E |−r hypercube. Thus, the results of Theorem 2 cannot be applied to the
i.i.d. case.
IV. IMPACT OF DEPENDENCY ON PRIVACY USING ANONYMIZATION AND OBFUSCATION
Here, we consider the case when both anonymization and obfuscation techniques are employed,
as shown in Figure 2. We assume similar obfuscation to [35]. To obfuscate the users’ data points,
for each user u, we independently generate a random variable Ru that is uniformly distributed
between 0 and an, where an ∈ (0, 1]. The value of Ru shows the probability that the user’s data
point is changed to a different value by obfuscation, and an is termed the “noise level’ of the
system. Let Zu be the vector that contains the obfuscated version of user u’s data points, and Z
be the collection of Zu for all users,
Zu =

Zu(1)
Zu(2)
...
Zu(m)

, Z = [Z1 Z2 · · · Zn] .
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Thus, the adversary’s observation Y is the anonymized version of Z;
Y = Perm (Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn;Π)
=
[
ZΠ−1(1) XΠ−1(2) · · · ZΠ−1(n)
]
= [Y1 Y2 · · · Yn] .
A. r-State i.i.d. Model
Now, assume users’ data points can have r possibilities (0, 1, · · · , r − 1). Similar to Sec-
tion III-A, we assume pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function,
fP(pu), which has support on a subset of the (0, 1)r−1 hypercube, and pu, fP(pu), and RP are
defined as in Section III-A.
To create a noisy version of data samples, for each user u, we independently generate a
random variable Ru that is uniformly distributed between 0 and an, where an ∈ (0, 1]2. Then,
the obfuscated data is obtained by passing the users’ data through an r-ary symmetric channel
with a random error probability Ru, so for j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}:
P(Zu(k) = j |Xu(k) = i) =

1 − Ru, for j = i.
Ru
r−1, for j , i.
The effect of the obfuscation is to alter the probability distribution function of each user’s
data points in a way that is unknown to the adversary, since it is independent of all past activity
of the user, and hence, the obfuscation inhibits user identification. For each user, Ru is generated
once and is kept constant for the collection of data points of length m, thus providing a very
low-weight obfuscation algorithm.
Now, define
Qu(i) = P (Zu(k) = i) ,
2It is desirable that our results are true over the largest set of strategies that users can employ. In fact, our results would apply
to a general set of distributions and are true for any random noise with support that extends out to the maximum amount of an.
The reason that we have used a uniformly random noise is that we want to have a similar mechanism as [35] to have a good
comparison between the results of this paper and [35] to show that dependency is a significant detriment to the privacy of users.
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where
Qu(i) = Pu(i)(1 − Ru) + (1 − Pu(i))Ru
= Pu(i) + (1 − 2Pu(i))Ru. (16)
The vectors Qu and Q which contain the obfuscated probabilities are defined as below:
Qu =

Qu(1)
Qu(2)
...
Qu(r − 1)

, Q = [Q1 Q2 · · · Qn] ,
and the vector containing the permutation of those probabilities after anonymization is W. Thus,
W = Perm (Q1,Q2, · · · ,Qn;Π)
=
[
QΠ−1(1) QΠ−1(2) · · · QΠ−1(n)
]
= [W1 W2 · · · Wn] .
Theorem 3. For the above r-state model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the
anonymized version of Z as defined above, the size of the group including user 1 is s, and
• m = Ω
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
)
for any α > 0;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0, an], where an = O
(
n−
1
s(r−1)−β
)
for any β > α4 ;
then, user 1 has no privacy at time k.
Discussion 6: It is insightful to compare this result to [35, Theorem 2]. We can see that when
users’ traces are dependent, the required level of obfuscation and anonymization to achieve
privacy is significantly higher. Therefore, we see that dependency can significantly reduce the
privacy of users. However, note that the asymptotic noise level is still zero in this case. Specif-
ically, if Am(u) = |{k:Zu(k),Xu(k)}|m , then
E[Am(u)] = E[Am] = O
(
n−
1
s(r−1)−β
)
→ 0,
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implying that the asymptotic noise level is zero.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and consists of three parts:
• First step: Showing the adversary can reconstruct the association graph of the obfuscated
and anonymized version of data with an arbitrarily small error probability.
• Second step: Showing the adversary can uniquely identify Group 1 with an arbitrarily small
error probability.
• Third step: Showing the adversary can successfully identify all of the members of Group
1 with an arbitrarily small error probability.
First step: Reconstruction of the association graph: In Lemma 1, we show that for the case
of anonymization, the adversary can reconstruct the entire association graph of the anonymized
data with an arbitrarily small error probability if the number of the adversary’s observations
per user (m) is bigger than (log n)3. Since obfuscation is done independently (from other users’
obfuscation and from users’ data), it does not change the association graph. Therefore, since
n
2
s(r−1) > (log n)3, we can use Lemma 1 to show the adversary can reconstruct the association
graph of the obfuscated and anonymized data with an arbitrarily small error probability.
Second step: Identifying Group 1 among all of the groups: Now, assume the size of Group
1 is s. Without loss of generality, suppose the members of Group 1 are users {1, 2, · · · , s}, so
there are at most ns groups of size s. We call these Groups 1, 2, · · · , ns . The adversary needs to
first identify the Group 1 among all of these groups.
According to Section III-A, Σs is defined as the set of all permutation on s elements, and
P(l) is a vector which contains probability distributions of users belong to Group l, and P˜(l)
Π
is a vector which contains the estimate of adversary about the probability distribution of users
belong to Group l. For example, For Group 1, we have
P(1) = [p1 p2 · · · ps] ,
and
P˜(1)
Π
=
[pΠ(1) pΠ(2) · · · pΠ(s)] .
We claim for m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α, an = c′n
−
(
1
s(r−1)+β
)
, and large enough n,
• P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1,
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• P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→ 0 ,
where ∆n = n
− 1
s(r−1)−α4 . As in Section III-A,
F (n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xs) ∈
(
R(r−1)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ ∆n, u = 1, 2, · · · , s
}
,
H (n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xs) ∈
(
R(r−1)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ 2∆n, u = 1, 2, · · · , s
}
.
First, we prove, for large enough n,
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1.
Note that for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, the adversary computes pu(i) as
follow: pu(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}|m , (17)
and as a result, pΠ(u)(i) = |{k : Zu(k) = i}|m = (M u(i)m , (18)
where
(
M u(i) = |{k : Zu(k) = i}|. Now, for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, we
have
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≤ ∆n
)
= P
(
pu(i) − ∆n ≤
(
M u(i)
m
≤ pu(i) + ∆n
)
= P
(
pu(i) − ∆n − qu(i) ≤
(
M u(i)
m
− qu(i) ≤ pu(i) + ∆n − qu(i)
)
.
Note that for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, we have
|pu(i) − qu(i)| = |1 − 2pu(i)|Ru
≤ Ru ≤ an,
so, we can conclude for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1},
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≤ ∆n
)
= P
(
pu(i) − ∆n − qu(i) ≤
(
M u(i)
m
− qu(i) ≤ pu(i) + ∆n − qu(i)
)
≥ P
(
−∆n + an ≤
(
M u(i)
m
− qu(i) ≤ −an + ∆n
)
= P
( (M u(i)m − qu(i)
 ≤ m(∆n − an)
)
. (19)
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By employing a Chernoff bound, we have
P
( (M u(i)m − qu(i)
 ≤ m(∆n − an)
)
≥ 1 − 2e− (∆n−an)
2
3qu (i)
≥ 1 − 2e
−
(
1
3qu (i)
) (
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
≥ 1 − 2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
(20)
Now from (19) and (20), we can conclude for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1},
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≤ ∆n
)
≥ 1 − 2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
,
and
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n
)
≤ 2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
. (21)
Now, for all u ∈ Group 1, all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1} and any β > α4 , (21) and the union bound
yield
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
r−1∑
i=1
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n
)
≤ 2s(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
→ 0,
as n→∞. As a result,
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1,
as n→∞.
In the next step, we prove P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→ 0. For all groups other than Group
1, we have
(4∆n)s(r−1)δ1 ≤ P
(
P(l) ∈ H ′(n)
)
≤ (4∆n)s(r−1)δ2,
and as a result,
P
(
P(l) ∈ H (n)
)
≤ δ2(4∆n)s(r−1)
= δ24s(r−1)
1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
.
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Similarly, for any σ ∈ Σs,
P
(
P(l)σ ∈ H ′(n)
)
≤ δ2(4∆n)s(r−1)
= δ24s(r−1)
1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
,
and since |Σs | = s!, by a union bound,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{ ⋃
σ∈Σs
{
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
}}ª®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
∑
σ∈Σs
P
(
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
)
≤ n
s
s!δ24s(r−1)
1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
= (s − 1)!4s(r−1)δ2n−α4 s(r−1) → 0,
as n→∞. Thus, all P(l)’s are outside of H (n) with high probability.
Now, we claim that given all P(l)’s are outside of H (n), P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
is arbi-
trarily small. In other words, by using a Chernoff bound, it is shown P˜(l)’s are close to P(l)’s,
and they will be outside of F (n). Thus, for all u ∈ Group l and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, (21) and
the union bound yield
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
= P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
r−1∑
i=1
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i)) ≤ ∆n
)
≤ 2s(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
.
Now, by using a union bound again, we can conclude, for any β > α4 ,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
≤ 2n(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
→ 0,
as n→∞. Thus, we have shown that for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ns }, P˜(l)’s are close to P(l), which are
outside of set F (n). As a result, as n→∞,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®¬→ 0.
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Third step: Identifying user 1 among all of the members of Group 1: In this step, we need
to prove that after identifying Group 1, the adversary can correctly identify each member. In
other words, the adversary should identify the permutation of Group 1.
From (17) and (18), for all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s} and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, we havepu(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}|m ,
and as a result,
pΠ(u)(i) = |{k : Zu(k) = i}|m = (M u(i)m ,
where
(
M u(i) = |{k : Zu(k) = i}|.
As in Section III-A, we define sets B(n) and C(n) as
B(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ ∆′n, i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1
}
,
C(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ 2∆′n, i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1
}
,
where ∆n = n
− 1
s(r−1)−α4 . We claim that for m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α and an = c′n
−
(
1
s(r−1)+β
)
,
1) P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1,
2) P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0,
as n→∞. Thus, the adversary can identify Π(1) by examining p˜u’s and choosing the only one
that belongs to B(n).
First, we show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1.
According to (21) and the union bound, for all u ∈ Group 1 and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, we
have
P
(pΠ(1) < B(n)) ≤ r−1∑
i=1
P
( (M 1(i)m − p1(i)
 ≥ ∆n
)
≤ (r − 1) ©­­«2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2ª®®¬ ,
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thus,
P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) ≤ 1 − (r − 1) ©­­«2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2ª®®¬→ 1,
as n→∞.
Now, we need to show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0.
First, we show as n goes to infinity,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{
pu ∈ C′(n)
})
→ 0.
Note for all u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , s},
4 (∆n)r−1 δ1 < P
(
pu ∈ C′(n)
)
< 4 (∆n)r−1 δ2,
and according to the union bound,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{
pu ∈ C(n)
})
≤
s∑
u=2
P
(
pu ∈ C(n)
)
≤ 4s (∆n)r−1 δ2
≤ 4s 1
n
1
s+
α(r−1)
4
δ2 → 0;
as n→∞. Thus, all pu’s are outside of C(n) with high probability.
Now, we claim that given all pu’s are outside of C(n), P
(pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) is arbitrarily small.
Note that for all u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , s} and all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 1}, (21) and the union bounds yield
P
(pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) ≤ P (pΠ(u) − pu ≥ ∆n)
≤
r−1∑
i=1
P
(pΠ(u)(i) − pu(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
.
As a result, by using a union bound again, as n becomes large,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) − pu ≥ ∆n}) ≤ s ©­­«2(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2ª®®¬→ 0.
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Thus, for all u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , s}, pΠ(u)’s are close to pu’s, thus they will be outside of B(n). Now,
we can conclude as n→∞ that:
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0.
So the adversary can successfully recover Z1(k). Since Z1(k) = X1(k) with probability 1 − Ru =
1 − o(1), the adversary can recover X1(k) with vanishing error probability. 
B. r-State Markov Chain Model
In this section, users’ data patterns are modeled using Markov chains and there are r possibili-
ties for users’ data patterns. Similar to Section III-B, we assume pu(i)’s are drawn independently
from some continuous density function, fP(pu), on the (0, 1)|E |−r hypercube, and pu, fP(pu), and
RP are defined in Section III-B.
By using the general idea stated in Section III-B, we can now repeat the similar reasoning as
Theorem 3 to show the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain model, iff Z is the obfuscated version
of X, and Y is the anonymized version of Z as defined above, the size of the group including
user 1 is s, and
• m = Ω
(
n
2
s( |E |−r)+α
)
for any α > 0;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0, an], where an = O
(
n−
1
s( |E |−r)−β
)
for any β > α4 ;
then, user 1 has no privacy at time k.
V. MORE GENERAL SETTING FOR THE ASSOCIATION GRAPH
The association graph structure that we have studied so far was somewhat general except for
one aspect: We assumed that people in a group can have dependency but they are independent
from members of other groups. It is natural to assume that there could be dependency between
members of each group and outside members. Here we discuss how to apply the developed
results to this more general setting.
Similar to [72]–[81], we consider a community structure with strong intra-community connec-
tions and weak inter-community connection. In the community structure the nodes of the network
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(a) A sketch of a small network displaying community structure. (b) The association graph consists of disjoint subgraphs.
Fig. 7: The adversary uses their prior knowledge to break inter-community edges.
can be grouped into sets of users such that each set of users is densely connected internally as
shown in Figure 7a. Here, we also assume that the adversary has some knowledge about all of
the covariances between users in addition to the marginal probability distributions: they know
whether the value of each covariance is less than or higher than a specific threshold. We show
that the adversary can reliably reconstruct the entire association graph for the anonymized version
of the data (i.e., the observed data traces) with relatively few observations.
Let G(V, F) denote the association graph with set of nodes V, (|V| = n), and set of edges
F. In this case, we use an association graph based on a threshold as follows: we assume two
vertices (users) are connected if their data sets are strongly correlated, and are not connected if
their data sets are weakly correlated. More specifically,
• (u, u′) < F iff Cov (Xu(k); Xu′(k)) ≤ 1,
• (u, u′) ∈ F iff Cov (Xu(k); Xu′(k)) ≥ 2,
where Cov (Xu(k); Xu′(k)) is the covariance between the k th data point of user u and user u′.
Lemma 2. Consider a general association graph, G(V, F), based on the threshold as described
above. If the adversary obtains m = (log n)3 anonymized observations per user, they can construct
G˜ = G˜(V˜, F˜), where V˜ = {Π(u) : u ∈ V} = V, such that with high probability, for all u, u′ ∈ V;
(u, u′) ∈ F iff (Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ F˜. We write this statement as P(G˜ ' G) → 1.
Proof. Note for u, u′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, we write v = Π(u) and v′ = Π(u′). We provide an algorithm
for the adversary that with high probability obtains all edges of F correctly. For each pair w
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and w′, the adversary computes Covvv′ as follows:
Covvv′ =
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i j M̂vv′(i, j)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v(i)
m
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v′(i)
m
(22)
where
M̂vv′(i, j) = |{k : Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j}|.
M̂v(i) = |{k : Yv(k) = i}|.
M̂v′( j) = |{k : Yv′(k) = j}|.
After observing m = (log n)3 data points per user and computing the above expressions, the
adversary constructs G˜ in the following way:
• If |Covvv′ | ≤ 1, then (v, v′) < F˜ .
• If |Covvv′ | ≥ 2, then (v, v′) ∈ F˜ .
We show the above method yields P(G˜ ' G) → 1 as n→∞, as follows. Note
M̂vv′(i, j) ∼ Binomial(m,wvv′(i, j)),
M̂v(i) ∼ Binomial(m,wv(i)),
Mv′(i) ∼ Binomial(m,wv′(i)),
where wvv′(i, j) = P (Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j), wv(i) = P (Yv(k) = i), and wv′(i) = P (Yv′(k) = i). From
proof of Lemma 1, by using (4), for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and all i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, we
have
0 ≤ mwvv′(i, j) − m 34 ≤ M̂vv′(i, j) ≤ mwvv′(i, j) + m 34 . (23)
0 ≤ mwv(i) − m 34 ≤ M̂v(i) ≤ mwv(i) + m 34 . (24)
0 ≤ mwv′(i) − m 34 ≤ M̂v′(i) ≤ mwv(i) + m 34 . (25)
Avv′(i, j) is defined as the event that (23), (24), and (25) are all valid, thus, based on proof of
Lemma 1, we have
P
©­«
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Avv′(i, j)}ª®¬→ 1, (26)
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as n → ∞. Let us define Cvv′ =
r−1⋂
i=1
r−1⋂
j=1
{Avv′(i, j)}. Now, if Cvv′ is true for some v, v′ ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}, according to (22), we have
Covvv′ =
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i j M̂vv′(i, j)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v(i)
m
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v′(i)
m
≤
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i j
(
mwvv′(i, j) + m 34
)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv(i) − m 34
)
m
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv′(i) − m 34
)
m
=
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i jwvv′(i, j) −
r−1∑
i=1
iwv(i)
r−1∑
i=1
iwv′(i)
+
r2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
4 +
r(r − 1)
2
r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 − r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2
≤ Covvv′ + r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
4 +
r(r − 1)
2
r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 + r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2 , (27)
where Covvv′ =
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i jwvv′(i, j) −
r−1∑
i=1
iwv(i)
r−1∑
i=1
iwv′(i). Similarly,
Covvv′ =
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i j M̂vv′(i, j)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂w(i)
m
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v′(i)
m
≥
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv(i) − m 34
)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv(i) + m 34
)
m
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv′(i) + m 34
)
m
= Covvv′ − r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
4 − r(r − 1)
2
r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 − r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2 . (28)
Now, by using (27) and (28), we haveCovvv′ − Covvv′ ≤ r2(r − 1)24 m− 14 + r(r − 1)2 r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 + r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2 . (29)
Let us define event Dvv′ as the event that (29) is valid, thus, we have shown, for all v, v′ ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}, Cvv′ ⊆ Dvv′, and consequently,{
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Cvv′}
}
⊆
{
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Dvv′}
}
.
As a result,
P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Dvv′}
)
≥ P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Cvv′}
)
.
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Thus, by using (26), we have
P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Dvv′}
)
→ 1,
as n→∞. Hence, with high probability, for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} , we have
Covvv′ − Covvv′ ≤ r2(r − 1)24 m− 14 + r(r − 1)2 r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 + r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2 . (30)
Thus, we can conclude, with high probability, for all v, v′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, Covvv′’s are close to
Covvv′’s.
Now, if (u, u′) is an inter-community edge, the adversary knows Covuu′ ≤ 1, and as a result,
Covvv′ ≤ 1, thus, the adversary removes that edge. Now, we can conclude (v, v′) < F˜, and
in other words, (Π(u),Π(u′)) < F˜ . This is true with high probability, simultaneously for all
u, u′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} where (u, u′) is an inter-community edge.
In addition, if (u, u′) is an intra-community edge, the adversary knows Covuu′ ≥ 2, and as a
result, Covvv′ ≥ 2. Now, we can conclude (v, v′) ∈ F˜, and in other words, (Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ F˜ .
This is true with high probability, simultaneously for all u, u′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} where (u, u′) is an
intra-community edge.
As a result, for large enough n, we have P
(
G˜ ' G
)
→ 1, so the adversary can reconstruct
the association graph of the anonymized version of the data which is based on a threshold with
an arbitrarily small error probability. 
Now, the adversary has a graph structure shown in Figure 7b, where subgraph G1 is a connected
graph with s1 vertices which is disjoint from the reminder of the association graph (G′ = G−G1).
In other words,
G = G1 ∪ G′.
Now, we can repeat the same reasoning as that in the proof of Theorem 1, Theorem 2,
Theorem 3, and Theorem 4 to obtain the same results for this case.
Discussion 7: The stochastic block model is a generative model for random graphs [83]–[89].
Note that there are two key differences between the stochastic block model and the work here.
First, in the stochastic block model, the edge set is sampled at random and the probability
distributions of edges are the key part of the work, while here the analysis is based on the
users’ data traces, and the statistical knowledge of the adversary is a key part. Second, in the
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stochastic block model, nodes within a community connect to nodes in other communities in an
equivalent way. In other words, any two vertices u ∈ Ci and v ∈ Cj are connected by an edge
with probability pi j , where Ci and Cj are different blocks, so all edges between two communities
have the same weights or strengths. While here, as shown in Figure 7a, there is no need that
the inter-community edges, corresponding to the covariance of nodes in separate communities,
has the same value as others; in other words, there is no need for the nodes in a community
to connect to the nodes in other communities in an equivalent way. In our work, for each of
intra-community edges, Covuu′ ≥ 2, and for each of inter-community edges, Covuu′ ≤ 1, thus,
edges have different weights.
VI. IMPROVING PRIVACY IN THE PRESENCE OF DEPENDENCY
In the previous parts of this paper, we argued and demonstrated that inter-user dependency
degrades the privacy provided by standard privacy-preserving mechanisms (PPMs). In this sec-
tion, we discuss how to design PPMs considering inter-user dependency in order to better
preserve privacy. First, note that independent obfuscation alone cannot be sufficient even at
a high noise level, because it cannot change the association graph. Therefore, the adversary can
still reconstruct the association graph with a small number of observations if we add independent
obfuscation noise. To mitigate this issue, we suggest that associated users collaborate in applying
the noise when deploying a PPM.
For clarity, we focus on the two-state i.i.d. case (r = 2). In the first part, we also focus on
the case the association graph consists of subgraphs with the size of each of them less than or
equal to 2 (sl ≤ 2). Thus, according to Figure 8, there are some connected users and there are
also some isolated users. First, we state the following lemma.
Fig. 8: Graph G consists of some subgraphs (Gl) with sl ≤ 2.
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Lemma 3. Let Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli(pu) and Xu′(k) ∼ Bernoulli(pu′); then, there exists an obfus-
cation technique with an asymptotic noise level
aˇ(u, u′) = Cov(Xu(k), Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′, 1 − pu, 1 − pu′},
for the dataset of user u and user u′ such that Zˇu(k) and Zˇu′(k) are independent from each
other. Note Zˇu(k) and Zˇu′(k) are the k th (reported) data point of user u and u′, respectively, after
applying obfuscation with the noise level equal to aˇ(u, u′).
Proof. We explain the idea behind this lemma by an example.
Example 1. Let Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli
(
3
5
)
and Xu′(k) ∼ Bernoulli
(
1
5
)
, and let Table I show the
joint probability mass function of Xu(k) and Xu′(k).
TABLE I: Joint probability mass function of Xu(k) and Xu′(k).
Xu(k)
Xu′(k)
0 1
0 720
1
20
1 920
3
20
As a result, if we observe 2000 bits of data, Table IIa shows the expected results according
to Table I.
Then, to make Zˇu(k) and Zˇu′(k) independent, it is sufficient for Zˇu(k)| Zˇu′(k) = 0 to have the
same distribution as Zˇu(k)| Zˇu′(k) = 1. This means we should have
P
(
Zˇu(k) = 1, Zˇu′(k) = 1
)
P
(
Zˇu′(k) = 1
) = P
(
Zˇu(k) = 1, Zˇu′(k) = 0
)
P
(
Zˇu′(k) = 0
) ;
thus, according to Table IIb,
300(1 − Υ)
100 + 300
=
900
700 + 900
→ Υ = 1
4
,
where Υ is the portion of data points Xu(k) that need to be flipped in the fourth region of
Table IIa (i.e., the region Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1). Now, we need to change 14 · 300 = 75 of data
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bits. As a result, if Xu(k) = 1 and Xu′(k) = 1, then, we pass Xu(k) through a BSC(14 ), and obtain
Zˇu(k). Hence, asymptotic noise level is equal to
aˇ(u, u′) = 3
20
· 1
4
= 3.75%.
TABLE II: (a) The expected results of Xu(k) and Xu′(k) according to Table I after observing
2000 bits of data, and (b) The desired results to make Zˇu(k) and Zˇu′(k) independent from each
other.
(a)
Xu(k)
Xu′(k)
0 1
0 700 100
1 900 300
(b)
Zˇu(k)
Zˇu′(k)
0 1
0 700 175
1 900 225
It is easy to check that the asymptotic noise level will be given by the equation in Lemma 3.
Specifically, for the above example,
Cov(Xu(k), Xu′(k)) = P(Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1) − P(Xu(k) = 1)P(Xu′(k) = 1) = 320 −
3
5
· 1
5
=
3
100
,
and we have
aˇ(u, u′) = Cov(Xu(k), Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′, 1 − pu, 1 − pu′} =
3
100
4
5
= 3.75%.
Now, to prove the lemma, apply the above procedure to a general table for a probability
mass function. Let Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli (pu) and Xu′(k) ∼ Bernoulli (pu′). Then, to make these two
sequences independent, it suffices if Zˇu(k)| Zˇu′(k) = 0 has the same distributions as Zˇu(k)| Zˇu′(k) =
1. We only prove for the case max{pu, pu′, 1 − pu, 1 − pu′} = 1 − pu′, and the proofs of the other
cases are similar to this one. Now, If Xu(k) = 1 and Xu′(k) = 1, we pass Xu(k) through a BSC(Υ)
in order to obtain Zˇu(k). Thus,
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 0)
1 − pu′ =
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1) (1 − Υ)
pu′
,
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and Υ can be calculated as
Υ = 1 − pu′
1 − pu′
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 0)
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1) .
Now, we can conclude,
aˇ(u, u′) = ΥP (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1)
=
(
1 − pu′
1 − pu′
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 0)
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1)
)
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1)
= P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1) − pu
′
1 − pu′ P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu
′(k) = 0)
=
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1) − pu′ (P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1) + P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 0))
1 − pu′
=
P (Xu(k) = 1, Xu′(k) = 1) − pupu′
1 − pu′
=
Cov(Xu(k), Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′, 1 − pu, 1 − pu′} .

Lemma 3 provides a method to convert correlated data to independent traces. The remaining
task is to show that we can achieve perfect privacy after applying such a method. As shown in
Figure 9, two stages of obfuscation and one stage of anonymization are employed to achieve
perfect privacy for users. Note that the first stage of obfuscation is due to Lemma 3 and the
second stage (as will be explained in the proof) is the same obfuscation technique given in
Theorem 1 of [35]. In Figure 9, Zˇu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user u at time k after
applying the first stage of obfuscation with the noise level equal to
aˇ(u, u′) = Cov(Xu(k), Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′, 1 − pu, 1 − pu′}
for the dataset of user u and user u′, Zu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user u at time k
after applying the second stage of obfuscation with the noise level equal to
an = c′n−( 1s−β),
and Yu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user u at time k after applying anonymization.
Consider G(V, F), where sl ≤ 2. We have the same model for pu as in the previous sections:
pu is chosen from some density fP(pu) such that, for δ1, δ2 > 0:
δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ (0, 1).
fP(pu) = 0, pu < (0, 1).
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Fig. 9: Applying obfuscation and anonymization techniques to the users’ data points.
Also, if (u, u′) ∈ F, ρuu′ is chosen according to some density fP(ρuu′ |pu, pu′) with range
of
[
0,min
{√
pu(1−pu′)
pu′(1−pu),
√
pu′(1−pu)
pu(1−pu′)
}]
. The following theorem states that we can indeed achieve
perfect privacy if we allow collaboration between users.
Theorem 5. For the two-state model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, Y is the anonymized
version of Z, and the size of all subgraphs are less than or equal to 2, there exists an anonymiza-
tion/obfuscation scheme such that for all (u, u′) ∈ F, the asymptotic noise level for users u and
u′ is at most
a(u, u′) = Cov(Xu(k), Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′, 1 − pu, 1 − pu′},
to achieve perfect privacy for all users. The anonymization parameter m = m(n) can be made
arbitrarily large.
Proof. There are two main steps.
Step 1: De-correlate based on Lemma 3. In particular, note that for at least half of the users,
no noise is added in this step. More specifically, define
U = Set of unaffected users = {u : no noise is added to user u in this step}.
Then after step 1, we have Zˇu(k) ∼ Bernoulli(qˇu). As a result,
• For u ∈ U; Zˇu(k) = Xu(k) and qˇu = pu.
• For u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} − U; Zˇu(k) , Xu(k) and qˇu , pu.
Note |U| ≥ n2 , because the main graph consists of some subgraphs with sl ≤ 2.
Step 2: Assume qˇu’s are known to the adversary. The setup is now very similar to Theorem
1 in [35], where perfect privacy is proved for the i.i.d. data. But there is a difference here.
Specifically, although the users’ data Zˇu(k) are now independent, the distribution of qˇu’s are not,
since they are the result of the data-dependent obfuscation technique of Lemma 3. Luckily, this
issue can be easily resolved so that we can show perfect privacy for user 1. The main idea is to
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use the fact that as stated above, at least n2 of the users are not impacted by the de-correlation
step. As we see below, these users will be sufficient to ensure perfect privacy for user 1 (which
may or may not be in the set U).
Let’s explore the distributions of Qˇu = qˇu for users in the set U. For any correlated pair of
users, the method of Lemma 3 leaves the one whose pu is farthest from 12 intact. Since pu’s
are chosen independently from each other and each user is correlated with only one user, it is
easy to see that for users in the set U, the qˇu’s are i.i.d. with the following probability density
function
fQˇ(qˇu) = 2 fP(qˇu)
∫ max(qˇu,1−qˇu)
min(qˇu,1−qˇu)
fP(x)dx.
Therefore, the setup is the same as Theorem 1 in [35] where we want to prove perfect privacy
for user 1, and we have n2 users who are independent from user 1 and their parameter qˇu
is chosen i.i.d. according to a density function. However, we need to check that the density
function fQˇ(qˇ) satisfies the condition δˇ1 < fQˇ(qˇu) < δˇ2 for some δˇ1 and δˇ2 on a neighborhood
qˇu ∈ [pu − ′, pu + ′]. First, note that
fQˇ(qˇu) = 2 fP(qˇu)
∫ max(qˇu,1−qˇu)
min(qˇu,1−qˇu)
fP(x)dx.
< 2δ22 = δˇ2.
Next,
fQˇ(qˇu) = 2 fP(qˇu)
∫ max(qˇu,1−qˇu)
min(qˇu,1−qˇu)
fP(x)dx.
> 2δ21 |1 − 2qˇu | = δˇ1.
Thus, as long as pu , 12 , the condition is satisfied
3. Therefore, we can show perfect privacy for
user 1. Note that here, in the second step, we need to apply a second stage of obfuscation and
apply anonymization according to Theorem 1 in [35]. Nevertheless, since the noise level an → 0
for this second stage, the asymptotic noise level will stay the same as that for step 1, i.e.
a(u, u′) = aˇ(u, u′) = |Cov(Xu(k), Xu′(k))|
max{pu, pu′, 1 − pu, 1 − pu′} .

3The case pu = 12 has zero probability, and thus need not be considered. Nevertheless, the result can be shown for pu =
1
2 ,
as all we require is a number of users proportional to the length of the interval in the vicinity of pu .
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(a) sl = 2. (b) sl = 3: Case 1. (c) sl = 3: Case 2.
Fig. 10: Three different ways which 3 users can be correlated to each other.
Now, the above method can be extended to the case where sl > 2. Let sl = 3. From Figure 10,
there are two different situations in this case:
1) Case 1: As shown in Figure 10b, user 1 and user 2 are correlated, and user 2 and user 3
are correlated. In the first step, we de-correlate user 2 and user 3 based on Lemma 3. Now,
we face a similar situation as that in the case sl = 2 (as shown in Figure 10a), and we
de-correlate them based on Lemma 3. Hence, we can make all of the users independent
from each other and then according to Theorem 5, we can achieve perfect privacy for all
of them.
2) Case 2: As shown in Figure 10c, all three users are correlated to each other. In the first
step, we use Lemma 3 to make user 1 and user 3 uncorrelated. Now, we have a similar
situation as case 1, so we can make all the users independent from each other and then,
according to Theorem 5, we can achieve perfect privacy for all of them.
Discussion 8: Note that obfuscating data by adding non-zero asymptotic noise may degrade
utility significantly. Therefore, in practice, it is usually not possible to de-correlate all dependent
users without imposing substantial utility degradation. In addition, in order to convert correlated
data to independent data, users should collaborate together and disclose their private data to each
other, which degrades privacy unless users trust each other. In such a setting, a possible approach
in applying our technique is to only add de-correlation noise to the data of highly-dependent
users (e.g., spouses and close friends), and leave data of less-dependent users (e.g., co-workers)
unchanged.
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TABLE III: Summary of the results for the case anonymization is employed as a PPM for "no
privacy" as a function of number of adversary’s observations per user (m). Here, s is the size
of group of users whose data traces are dependent, r is the number of possible values for each
user’s data point, |E | is the size of set of edges in the Markov chain, and the results hold for
any α > 0.
Users’ data model
Independent users [34] Dependent users
m m
Two-state i.i.d. model Ω
(
n2+α
)
Ω
(
n
2
s +α
)
r-state i.i.d. model Ω
(
n
2
r−1+α
)
Ω
(
n
2
s(r−1)+α
)
r-state Markov chain model Ω
(
n
2
|E |−r +α
)
Ω
(
n
2
s(|E |−r )+α
)
TABLE IV: Summary of the results for the case both obfuscation and anonymization are
combined to be employed as a PPM for "no privacy" as a function of number of adversary’s
observations per user (m) and the amount of noise level (an). Here, s is the size of group of
users whose data traces are dependent, r is the number of possible values for each user’s data
point, |E | is the size of set of edges in the Markov chain, and the results hold for any α > 0.
Users’ data model
Independent users [35] Dependent users
m an m an
Two-state i.i.d. model Ω
(
n2+α
)
O
(
n−1−β
)
Ω
(
n
2
s +α
)
O
(
n−
1
s −β
)
r-state i.i.d. model Ω
(
n
2
r−1+α
)
O
(
n− 1r−1−β
)
Ω
(
n
2
s(r−1)+α
)
O
(
n−
1
s(r−1)−β
)
r-state Markov chain model Ω
(
n
2
|E |−r +α
)
O
(
n−
1
|E |−r −β
)
Ω
(
n
2
s(|E |−r )+α
)
O
(
n−
1
s(|E |−r )−β
)
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for his valuable suggestions and discussions regarding graph alignments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Resourceful adversaries can leverage statistical matching based on the prior behavior of
users in order to break the privacy provided by PPMs. Our previous work has considered
the requirements on anonymization and obfuscation for “perfect” user privacy when traces are
independent between users. However, in practice users have correlated data traces, as relationships
between users establish dependence in their behavior. In this paper, we demonstrated that such
dependency degrades the privacy of PPMs, as the anonymization employed must be significantly
increased to preserve perfect privacy, and often no degree of independent obfuscation of the
traces can be effective. The summary of the results is shown in Tables III and IV. We have also
presented preliminary results on dependent obfuscation to improve users’ privacy.
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